Managing for High-Quality Science and Engineering at the NNSA National Security Laboratories by Division on Engineering & Physical Sciences

Author:Division on Engineering & Physical Sciences
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: The National Academies Press
Published: 2013-09-09T00:00:00+00:00

C

Review of Relevant Studies and Reports 1995-2010

As part of this study, the study committee reviewed a number of relevant studies that were done in the period 1995-2010. These are listed at the end of this appendix. This appendix summarizes what those studies said about issues that are relevant to this report. This appendix is not an exhaustive analysis in that: (1) it does not review all matters addressed in the referenced reports, just those that were directly relevant to the work of the study committee; and (2) the list of major reports as reviewed does not include every study of possible relevance.

This Appendix First summarizes the four major issues that emerged consistently from the reviewed studies. Then it discusses each of these issues in greater detail.

EVOLVING AND PERSISTING ISSUES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORIES

Several issues have persisted and evolved in the management of the nuclear weapons laboratories since the mid-to-late 1990s. These issues have one theme in common: the absence of an effective governance structure. Four issues involving laboratory management, of which advisory groups continue to find evidence of, pervade the weapons complex:

1. An unclear commitment to, and view of, the laboratory mission;

2. An unstable workforce and lack of adequate plan to maintain core competencies;

3. Unclear roles and responsibilities assigned to DOE/NNSA headquarters and to the offices and programs included within the laboratory governance structure, ill-defined and duplicated lines of authority and oversight, including the failure of NNSA to achieve its intended independence; and

4. Excessive number of reviews and oversight by external organizations, particularly by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

Issue 1: An unclear commitment to, and view of, the laboratory mission.

It is evident from reports published in the mid-to-late 1990s that this time was a hectic and disorganized period for the laboratories. The testing of nuclear weapons ended in 1992, and with the establishment of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, national priorities and the mission of the laboratories were changing due to the ban on nuclear testing (GAO, 1995). During this period, there was confusion on the part of the laboratories as to which priorities should be deemed ones of national importance and commitment. Many reports cite the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) lack of direction as a cause. A 1995 GAO advisory group tasked with examining the labs’ missions stated that the laboratories lacked clearly defined missions, failing to adapt them to changing national priorities and evolving Department objectives, despite recommendations from advisory groups to redefine the laboratory missions.

The 1995 Task Force on Alternative Futures (a.k.a. the “Galvin Task Force”), believed it was not appropriate or resourceful for the laboratories to acquire new mission areas outside of their traditional ones, including developing technologies for the private sector (DOE, 1995). The Task Force observed “excessive scrambling” on the part of the laboratories in acquiring new mission areas outside of their traditional ones. While they approved of utilizing the laboratories capabilities such as “high performance computation, advanced materials, energy technologies, and systems engineering” to solve other national priorities,

These activities

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.